FAILURES
 
By
William L. R. Rice
 
Over the years, my career path was strewn with failures caused by others. While  they were not of my own making, they often had a profound effect on my own career choices.   Some of these failures may be of interest to the reader.
 
In March of 1955 I published my graduate thesis for the USAF Institute of Technology (USAFIT).  It was entitled, “Cation Adsorption on Clay Surfaces”.  I had studied the adsorption of ionized lanthanum on montmorillonite clay.  The study related to the possibility of using clays to decontaminate nuclear reactor waste products, followed by firing of the clay to make an impervious body for long term waste disposal.  At that time disposal of radioactive waste was recognized by the industry as a serious impediment to the use of nuclear power.  Although nearly a half-century has now passed, the US still does not have a permanent site for disposal of radioactive waste.  The Yucca Mountain facility in Nevada is proposed as a disposal site, but is found objectionable by many.  So the Government has thus far failed in its statutory responsibility to provide a waste disposal site for the nuclear industry.
 
Following graduation from USAFIT, I was assigned to the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) program.  I managed research contracts to develop radiation resistant fluids and lubricants for use in the nuclear bomber.  The ANP program never succeeded, because it was not possible to develop materials capable of withstanding the high temperature and intense nuclear radiation environment of a nuclear propulsion system.  Yet proponents managed to drag the program out for many years.  It took a direct order by President John F. Kennedy in 1963 to  terminate the program.  So this $2 billion program failed.  (Although there was no longer an end use, my modest program did find organic compounds with resistance to high temperature and nuclear radiation [e.g. bis(m-phenoxyphenyl) ether].)
 
I joined the US Atomic Energy Commission in 1959 and managed research on high temperature nuclear fuels and materials.  During my early years in this capacity, I was on occasion quite critical of the ANP program, which was still in existence.  Shortly after President Kennedy terminated the program, my Branch Chief called me into his office and said with a big smile that he had an additional job for me.  With the demise of ANP, it was decided that the high temperature refractory materials effort at GE in Cincinnati was to continue for several years, with an annual budget of about $6 million.  This would allow completion of the ongoing research.  I was assigned responsibility for Headquarters management of the effort!  I learned at this point that being critical can sometimes backfire.  This follow-on research was very successful, but was also classified.  Hence the public had no ready access to the technical results.   
 
One of my responsibilities during this period was to chair the AEC’s High Temperature Fuels Committee, where I placed strong emphasis on the reporting of failure.  The most effective way to learn about new fuels is to test them to failure, to learn use limitations.  So when the Committee met, I would emphasize the importance of good reporting on failures.  In fact, I instituted an award for the best report.  At the end of the three-day meeting, I would announce the winner, who then received a bottle of Virginia wine.  The expense was minor, but the competition to receive this award became intense!
 
After various assignments, I joined the Division of Controlled Thermonuclear Research in 1972.  This Division was responsible for developing a successful fusion reactor for generation of power.  The fusion energy program began in the early 1950’s, with the stated purpose of attaining controlled fusion energy in  20 years.  For 50 years, success has always been in the future.  In fact, fusion experts now talk about operating a demonstration fusion power plant in about 35 years, to enable the commercialization of fusion power.  It would appear that with each year that passes, the goal now slips further into the future!
 
Although progress in the fusion program was limited in the early 1970’s, we actually convinced the Congressional oversight committees to provide increased funding each year.  The technical criteria for fusion energy success were presented to the oversight committees on semi-logarithmic paper, which non-technical members of Congress were unlikely to understand!  What looked like nearness to success on the graphs was no such thing. The technical data were simply being extrapolated to the next decade on the log scale and success was still a long way off.  But the members of the committees were impressed and thought that progress was significant!  Despite the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars, the program thus far has failed to meet its original goals.
 
Shortly after I left the Division, an avoidable management failure occurred.  My former secretary came to me and told me that she had been asked to resign by her new boss, solely because she was pregnant.  I was amazed by this action and told her to seek guidance from the Director of Personnel.  As a result, she was reassigned within the Division with no loss of status and the Division Director had an intense closed-door training session with the Personnel Director.
 
The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished and programs were transferred to the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) on January 19, 1975.  I claim no responsibility for the termination of the AEC, but I did manage the farewell party.  It was held at the Bureau of Standards cafeteria in Germantown, MD, and was attended by thousands.  As one benchmark, the group consumed 80 gallons of hard liquor at the four open bars.  The party was a success and only one attendee was arrested for drunkenness!
 
In 1975 I became an Assistant Director of the ERDA Office of Congressional Rela-tions.  My subject areas included solar, geothermal and fusion energy.  One notable failure in this period was the solar energy program.  The Government provided major funding to support a residential and commercial solar heating program.  Congress also provided tax credits to induce the use of solar systems.  The credits diminished with time, and when they disappeared, so did the solar industry.  Hence, the solar energy program ultimately failed without the artificial financial supports that had been provided.  (As I write this, I understand that wind energy appears to have finally become a financially competitive technology).
 
 On a number of occasions, members of Congress were asked by constituents where one could best earn a Masters degree in solar energy.  When such inquiries were forwarded to me, I told the constituent to work instead toward a Masters in Mechanical Engineering, and take electives related to solar energy.  I said that solar energy was not a field with a bright future and they were better off earning a more basic engineering degree.  Time proved me right!
 
ERDA was abolished September 30, 1977, and the Department of Energy was established.  I served for a brief time in the geothermal energy program, and then transferred to the uranium enrichment program in 1980.  I ultimately became responsible for managing development of the Advanced Gas Centrifuge (AGC) for uranium enrichment.  This was a short-lived responsibility.  A decision was made in 1985 to establish a selection committee, responsible for picking the next generation technology for enrichment.  AGC was competed against the process called Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS).  A $2 billion gas centrifuge plant had already been built in southern Ohio, so a technology that existed was compared with a technology that merely looked good on paper.  However, key members of the selection committee had previously managed AVLIS technologies, so the outcome was preordained.  AGC lost, and the existing centrifuge facility was dismantled.  AVLIS won, yet was never built and never proved what it could do.  So the enrichment program suffered a major failure of purpose.  At this point, I had enough.  I had always enjoyed working with young people, and decided to explore how I could become a high school Physics teacher.  This became possible in the fall of 1986, so I retired from Government after a 33 year career.
 
In my new capacity as a teacher, I observed some unique failures in the field of education.  The most notable related to a study of student self esteem.  An educator in the Superintendent’s office initiated a program to promote student self esteem.  This was conducted in a middle school that sent students on to my high school.  The heart of the process was to never give a failing grade of “F”.  Instead, the student would receive a grade of “IP”, meaning “In Progress”.  The outcome of this study was creation of a student body that had exceedingly high self esteem, but very poor study habits.  Their rude awakening occurred when they entered high school and began to receive failing grades.  Their self esteem was demolished and they were left floundering.  My colleagues told me that they could spot these students within the first week, and could project that they would do poorly.  From this example, and others, I learned to suspect the quality of a PhD in Education!
 
So, what did I learn about failure during my working days?  I learned the obvious, that deliberate failures are recognized as sound engineering, for they define system limitations.  I learned that concealing a lack of progress or hiding unexpected failures will ultimately backfire.  This can lead to project cancellation and/or the firing of persons involved.  And finally, I learned that management failures are inexcusable.  They indicate poor management skills and reflect back on the perpetrator.  Such failures can only hurt one's career.
 
Despite the above, both of my careers were time well spent.  With but one exception (a year spent in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), every one of my assignments was productive and enjoyable.  I can only hope that other members of the Class of 1953 have had such varied and interesting careers!